The real options theory of corporate investment, dating back to Myers (1977) , recognizes a manager has the option to delay an investment decision and undertake it at some point in the future. Subsequent development by McDonald and Siegel (1986) , Dixit (1989) , Trigeorgis and Mason (1987) , Brennan and Schwartz (1985) , Pindyck (1991) and Dixit and Pindyck (1994) amongst others, have ensured the real options approach is fully integrated into modern corporate finance.
The real assets underlying these options are typically not traded. To date, however, the theory has relied on the fact that "capital markets are sufficiently complete" (Myers and Majd (1990) ) and risks are hedged perfectly via an appropriate spanning asset. An exception is the model of McDonald and Siegel (1986) which assumes investors are risk-averse to market risks but risk-neutral towards idiosyncratic risks. Neither type of model recognizes that nontradability may introduce idiosyncratic risks towards which the manager is risk-averse. This paper attempts to address this limitation of the classic real options valuation models and extend the theory to include incompleteness and risk-aversion to idiosyncratic risks. We do this by developing a partial spanning model.
Our framework involves an owner-manager facing an irreversible investment decision under uncertainty. The decision can be made over an infinite horizon, enabling comparisons with the classic models of McDonald and Siegel (1986) and Dixit and Pindyck (1994) . 1 The project value is not traded, and although the manager can trade in a correlated asset, there are remaining unhedgeable idiosyncratic risks, making the market incomplete. In contrast to complete models, the traded correlated asset only partially spans the project value, and idiosyncratic risks cannot be hedged away. Inherent in taking these risks into account is the introduction of risk preferences. The manager's preferences are described by the exponential utility function, allowing a closed-form solution in our model. The manager's investment problem is to maximize his expected utility of wealth over an infinite horizon, where wealth consists of the cash amount from trading in the risky asset and riskless bond, and the option payoff received at the time of investment. Issues of how to value cashflows at intermediate times via utility functions arise and we consider time consistency properties of utilities to arrive at a sensible formulation. 2 The manager's valuation of the option to invest is found by a certainty equivalence argument. This represents the compensation the manager would require to give up the right to the option. In common with the risk-neutral and McDonald and Siegel (1986) models, the value depends on the investment costs and trigger level, which in turn depends on the Sharpe ratios of the project and partial spanning asset. However, unlike the classic models, the incomplete model valuation depends on risk-aversion. Both the risk-neutral and McDonald and Siegel (1986) solutions are shown to be special cases of our incomplete valuation. The risk-neutral model is obtained in the limit as the correlation between the project value and traded asset tends to one, whilst the McDonald and Siegel (1986) model obtains when the risk aversion tends to zero.
We relate the incomplete valuation to the familiar classic ones by representing it as an optimal stopping problem where the expectation is taken under a new pricing measure, or equivalently the project value has a particular expected rate of return. In fact, the McDonald and Siegel (1986) valuation can also be written in terms of this same rate of return, since it is exactly the pricing measure that compensates for market but not idiosyncratic risks. The difference is that in the incomplete model, the expectation and payoff appear non-linearly in the valuation rather than linearly as in McDonald and Siegel (1986) . This occurs because of the manager's risk-aversion to idiosyncratic risks. Alternative assumptions on the form of the risk-aversion (such as power utility) would require the model to be solved numerically, but this would not affect the qualitative conclusions concerning incompleteness we make in the paper.
Incompleteness and risk-aversion to idiosyncratic risk have both qualitative and quantitative impact on the value of the option to invest and the investment timing decision. Qualitatively, the criteria leading to a solution in terms of a finite option value and investment trigger differs between the incomplete and classic models. Our incomplete model will give a finite option value and trigger level in a wider range of situations than either the riskneutral or McDonald and Siegel (1986) models. This means that approximating via these models when the manager is risk-averse to idiosyncratic risks will potentially give an incorrect investment decision.
The manager faces unhedgeable idiosyncratic risks in our model. As these risks become greater (and the manager's situation more incomplete), the risk-averse manager is induced to invest earlier and place less value on the option. He has a similar incentive if his riskaversion to idiosyncratic risk increases. Incompleteness and risk-aversion reduce the gap between investment times of the NPV criteria and those of the classic real options models. Put another way, the classic models may be overstating the worth of the option to invest, resulting in under-investment. In particular, in the additional situations mentioned earlier, risk-aversion and incompleteness result in a dramatic reduction from an infinite to finite value and trigger, since the manager following a risk-neutral or McDonald and Siegel (1986) model would never invest in this case.
In this new region, there are two interesting phenomena. We show the value of the option to invest is no longer everywhere convex in the project value. The manager's risk-aversion can outweigh the typical convexity effect and the additional option value from an extra dollar of project value can diminish as project value increases. We also find that uncertainty can reduce the value of the option to invest and speed up investment, in contrast to the behavior in the risk-neutral and McDonald and Siegel (1986) models. As uncertainty becomes infinitely large, our incomplete model gives a finite limiting value for the option to invest. This also differs from the classic models where the option value tends to infinity. All of these features are illustrated in numerical examples in Section 6.
Our analysis is motivated by practical relevance as well as theoretical considerations. There is little evidence in practice that perfect spanning assets exist, and indeed many authors including Pinches (1998) , Lander and Pinches (1998) and Borison (2003) have observed that incompleteness should be considered. For instance, Pinches (1998) suggests that "one avenue for significant future research is that of valuation of options in incomplete markets".
The conclusion that incompleteness and risk-aversion leads to earlier investment appears consistent with empirical evidence in the area of executive stock options. Huddart and Lang (1996) find a pattern of option exercises well before expiration. There have been many models attempting to value executive stock options recently. In common with this paper, a feature is to treat the executive's inability to trade the firm's stock. Detemple and Sundaresan (1999) address this in a binomial model whilst Kahl et al (2003) propose a continuous time utility maximization model for valuing restricted stock. The recent work of Kadam et al (2003) is closest to ours. They value a perpetual American option under the assumption that executive's have exponential utility, but with no spanning asset. We obtain the valuation of Kadam et al (2003) as a special case in our model. 3 There are a number of papers in the literature treating the valuation of options on nontraded assets, albeit not in a real options context. The work of Henderson (2002) and Henderson and Hobson (2002) considers European style options and as such, cannot make conclusions concerning optimal investment behavior. Finite horizon American style options are considered in Musiela and Zariphopoulou (2003) however, closed form solutions cannot be found, and few conclusions are made. 4 The paper of Smith and Nau (1995) (and the related earlier ideas of Constantinides (1978) ) is closer in spirit to our partial spanning model. They propose an integrated approach using the hedging arguments of option pricing for risks spanned perfectly by traded assets and decision analysis to value risks that are not spanned. However their set-up is discrete time and no conclusions are made concerning the effects of their proposed model. Unlike these papers, we concentrate on the impact of incompleteness in an infinite horizon model which recovers the popular real options models as special cases. A powerful feature of our incomplete model is the fact that we can solve explicitly for the manager's valuation of the option to invest and the optimal investment trigger level. This is useful in a number of ways. Solving in closed form enables us to characterize situations where it is optimal for the firm to invest at a certain time, and those where investment is postponed indefinitely. This has particular relevance since we characterize additional scenarios (in terms of the project's Sharpe ratio) leading to a finite investment trigger level and option value. In these situations, if correlation were perfect or the manager was risk-neutral to idiosyncratic risk, there would be no solution and the manager would wait forever.
The paper is structured as follows. The investment problem faced by a manager who is risk-averse to idiosyncratic risks is considered and our modeling assumptions are outlined in Section 1. The manager's problem is solved in Section 2 and the optimal investment trigger and value function are given in closed form. Section 3 presents the manager's certainty equivalence valuation of the option and relates it to those in the classic models. The limiting cases of risk-neutrality, and the McDonald and Siegel (1986) model are obtained in Section 4. The important qualitative difference in the incomplete model is highlighted in Section 5, whilst Section 6 considers the quantitative effects of risk-aversion, imperfect correlation and uncertainty on the value and investment timing. A final section concludes the paper.
The Investment Problem and Modeling Assumptions
Consider a firm facing an irreversible investment decision 5 of when to invest in a single project. The firm is owned by a risk-averse owner-manager who makes the investment decisions. The manager can be thought of as an entrepreneur since the only asset of the firm is the option to invest. The manager is faced with the timing decision of when to invest in a project with value V at some point in the future. We assume the manager's time horizon is infinite. The project value V is not a traded asset, and is not perfectly spanned by a traded asset, hence markets are not complete. In contrast to existing models, the manager faces an incomplete market and is risk-averse towards the unhedgeable private or idiosyncratic risks. Our aim is to investigate how incompleteness and risk-aversion to idiosyncratic risk affect the manager's investment decision and the value of the option to invest.
We assume the value of the project V follows 6
where ξ = ν−r η is the project's Sharpe ratio and ν is the total expected return on the project, η is the volatility of project value and W is a standard Brownian motion.
Although there is no perfect spanning asset in our model, the manager is able to trade a correlated asset P and invest in a riskless bond with constant interest rate r. In practice, the asset P could be the market asset, an industry benchmark or an individual or basket of stocks. We call P a partial spanning asset, partial because the project value V is only partially spanned by it, leaving some remaining idiosyncratic risk. The extreme case where there is no relevant spanning asset for the project at all is covered in our model by taking correlation equal to zero.
The partial spanning asset follows a lognormal process
where λ = µ−r σ is its Sharpe ratio. The two driving Brownian motions B and W are correlated with correlation −1 ≤ ρ ≤ 1. 7 The case we are interested in is where |ρ| < 1, and there is a component of private or idiosyncratic risk remaining after the manager has traded in P and the riskless bond. The special case where correlation is one corresponds to having a perfect spanning asset and complete markets. We will show later that this recovers the classic risk-neutral valuation.
Since the manager faces incomplete markets, we represent his risk preferences with the exponential utility function U (x) = − 1 γ e −γx , γ > 0 exhibiting constant absolute risk-aversion. As γ → 0, our incomplete valuation will approach that of McDonald and Siegel (1986) where the investor is risk-neutral to idiosyncratic risk but risk-averse to market risk. The risk-averse manager maximizes the value of the firm by utility maximization of the value of the option to invest.
If the manager undertakes the investment at time τ ≥ t , the payoff is represented by
where K is a constant and the investment cost Ke r(τ −t) grows over time at the riskless interest rate. This cost structure represents a special case of McDonald and Siegel's setup 6 The form of our results will hold also for more general models for V of the form
although we concentrate on the lognormal model for simplicity and comparison purposes here. 7 Note we can express W as a linear combination of B and a Brownian motion Z independent of B, giving dW = ρdB + p 1 − ρ 2 dZ.
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where investment costs can follow a stochastic process. However, Dixit and Pindyck (1994) present a special case of our setup where investment costs are constant over time. Differences in the specification of investment cost do not change the qualitative conclusions of our paper. The manager can partially hedge in the traded asset P and the riskless bond, generating trading wealth X via 8
where θ is the cash amount invested in the partial spanning asset P , and remaining wealth is invested at rate interest r. The manager's investment problem can be expressed as a utility maximization problem: to maximize the expected utility of wealth over an infinite horizon. Wealth refers to both the quantity X the manager generates by trading, and the payoff (V τ − Ke r(τ −t) ) + received at the time of investment. The manager chooses optimally the time to invest τ , and the hedge θ, in the partial spanning asset P .
As is the case in the classic real options models, we will find the manager invests if the project value V climbs high enough compared with the investment costs. Our model will give a characterization of the level V needs to reach, and the manager's certainty equivalence valuation of the option to invest in closed form.
The utility maximization we propose requires valuing a cashflow at the investment time τ < ∞ which is not usually considered in standard utility maximization problems. We need to consider time consistency of utility functions, which is discussed in the Appendix. Mathematically, the value function for the manager's investment problem is given by the optimal stopping problem:
where the appropriate time consistent exponential utility function U τ (x) is given in the following proposition.
Proposition 1.1 The time consistent exponential utility function is given by
where A is a constant and γ is the constant absolute risk-aversion of the manager at the fixed time t. The value function for the manager's investment problem in the incomplete model can be written as
Proof: The Appendix contains the details of the time consistent utility, given in (A-6). The reformulation of the value function is then immediate.
The Solution: Optimal Investment Trigger and Manager's Value Function
A non-linear Bellman equation can now be derived (see the Appendix) for G(X t , V t ) from which we can solve for the optimal investment trigger level τ * and holding in the partial spanning asset θ * . First, a transformation is taken to remove non-linearities and second, a standard power-type solution is found to the linear equation. In the stopping region,
In the continuation region,
and G solves the non-linear equation
with boundary, value matching and smooth pasting conditions
The optimal investment time τ * is given by
so investment takes place when the discounted project value reaches some constant level V (ρ,γ) . We characterize this constant shortly. We now want to solve the non-linear pde (5). Proposing a solution of the form
Choosing g = 1 1−ρ 2 eliminates the non-linear term completely, leaving
with corresponding conditions on Γ(v)
We propose a solution of the form Γ(v) = L (ρ,γ) v ψ , which gives
+ B, and (8) > 0 (correspondingly ξ < λρ + η 2 ), the firm will invest at time τ * . In the case β (9) gives an expression for L (ρ,γ) and via (10) we solve for the optimal investment trigger,Ṽ (ρ,γ) , as the solution tõ
Reiterating, the value of β
governs whether it is optimal for the manager to ever invest. When ξ < λρ + η 2 , the Sharpe ratio on the project is lower than the critical value in terms of the traded Sharpe ratio, correlation and project value. In this case, there is an opportunity cost to keeping the option alive represented by the difference λρ
, then there is no such opportunity cost and the option should be kept alive whilst the manager waits.
Recalling the form of the value function G(x, v), we find the solution is of the form
3 The Value of the Option to Invest in the Incomplete Market
We are interested in the value of the option to invest, having solved for the optimal investment time, and the manager's value function thus far. The risk-averse manager's valuation of the 9 The dependence of β
on γ is simply notational to distinguish it from the special cases considered later in the paper.
10 If β option to invest can be found by a certainty equivalence argument. This establishes the certain amount at which the manager would be indifferent between owning the investment option and selling the option for a certain amount. Equivalently, it represents the compensation required by the manager for giving up the right to the option payoff. As we will see later, the manager's certainty equivalence value and the risk-neutral value coincide when the correlation is perfect. Additionally, as the manager's risk-aversion approaches zero, his valuation approaches that of McDonald and Siegel (1986) . We evaluate the certainty equivalent amount by comparing the value achievable by investing in P and the riskfree asset and receiving the amount p (ρ,γ) (v) for the option, to the value achievable by having the option. Equating the two values and solving for p (ρ,γ) (v) gives Proposition 3.1 The manager's certainty equivalence valuation of the option to invest is given by
whereṼ (ρ,γ) solves (12) and β
is given in (11).
The risk-averse manager's certainty equivalence value in (14) depends on the level of investment costs K and the investment trigger levelṼ (ρ,γ) (both in discounted terms) which in turn depends on the Sharpe ratios of the project and spanning asset. It also depends on the correlation between the project value and the value of the partial spanning asset. The manager's risk-aversion γ enters into the valuation since he is risk-averse to idiosyncratic risks, not merely to market risks. This is in contrast to the risk-neutral and McDonald and Siegel (1986) valuations. We will see later in Section 6 how these differences alter the value of the option to invest in numerical examples.
We now provide a second representation for the value of the option to invest in our incomplete setting. Following the statement of the proposition, we will contrast this representation with the more familiar risk-neutral and equilibrium (McDonald and Siegel (1986) ) representations. This will shed light on the impact of risk-aversion and incompleteness on the valuation.
Proposition 3.2 The manager's certainty equivalence valuation of the option to invest (given in Proposition 3.1) can be represented as
where E Q 0 denotes expectation with respect to pricing measure Q 0 , defined as follows. For
where B 0 = B + λt is a Q 0 -Brownian motion and the independent Brownian motion Z is unchanged under Q 0 . The project value V follows
under Q 0 .
Proof: The details of the proof are relegated to the Appendix.
We can interpret the result of the proposition as follows. Recall, in a classic risk-neutral model where V is perfectly spanned by P , the value of the option to invest can be expressed as the risk-neutral expectation (denoted by E Q ) of the discounted value of the payoff, maximized over investment times:
A similar representation holds under the model of McDonald and Siegel (1986) 11 albeit involving the equilibrium expected rate of return on the investment, µ e ,
The representation in our incomplete framework given in Proposition 3.2 is similar to these more familiar ones with two striking differences. First, the expectation is taken with respect to a different pricing measure, Q 0 , rather than say, risk-neutral pricing. Second, the value is a non-linear function of the payoff. Both of these differences are due to the manager's risk-aversion to idiosyncratic risks via exponential utility. Note that other specifications of utility would change the precise non-linear form in Proposition 3.2, but would not alter the qualitative conclusions we make in the paper.
We can say more about the new pricing measure Q 0 appearing in the valuation. This pricing measure is exactly the one that compensates for market risks but not unhedgeable idiosyncratic risks (since Z is left unchanged). 12 This pricing measure is essentially involved in models where idiosyncratic risks are not compensated, including those of Merton (1976) and Hull and White (1987) . In fact, we show in the next section that the valuation of McDonald and Siegel (1986) can be written in terms of this pricing measure, since they do not compensate for idiosyncratic risk. Their valuation can be expressed as an expectation under Q 0 of the payoff, and so is a straightforward linear pricing representation. In our incomplete model, risk-aversion to idiosyncratic risks is incorporated, and therefore it might seem surprising in the light of this discussion that this same pricing measure appears. The distinction is that Q 0 appears in a non-linear way in Proposition 3.2. risk-neutral valuation obtains when we let ρ → 1, whilst the McDonald and Siegel (1986) valuation is recovered by taking γ → 0. First, we present the classic risk-neutral valuation. 13 Proposition 4.1 Risk-Neutral Valuation Under the assumption |ρ| = 1, the risk-neutral Bellman equation is
Let β
(1)
1 > 1 (or equivalently ξ < λ), the risk-neutral value of the option to invest is
and the investment trigger takes the form
Investment is postponed forever if β
1 ≤ 1 (or equivalently ξ ≥ λ). The option value in this case is infinite.
Proof: See the Appendix. This is the familiar risk-neutral valuation. Provided the Sharpe ratio on the project is less than that on the partial spanning asset, the manager invests at the first time the discounted project value reaches the constant levelṼ (1) . Now consider the model of McDonald and Siegel (1986) . We state here their results (in our notation) for the case we consider where investment costs grow at the riskless rate. 14 Proposition 4.2 McDonald and Siegel (1986) Valuation Under the assumption of risk-aversion towards market risks and risk-neutrality towards idiosyncratic risks, the Bellman equation is
with the same boundary, value matching and smooth pasting conditions as in the risk-neutral model. Recall, µ e is the required rate of return on the investment in equilibrium.
Under CAPM, the equilibrium rate of return on the project is given asν = r + λρη and
where β (ρ) solves the quadratic
with δ =ν − ν = r + λρη − ν, the difference in the equilibrium expected rate of return and the expected return on the project. 15 The Bellman equation in (26) becomes
Let
When β
1 > 1 (or equivalently,ν > ν or ξ < λρ), the value of the option to invest under the McDonald and Siegel (1986) model is
with investment trigger of the formṼ
The option value is infinite in this case.
This time, we see that if the rate of return on the project is less than the equilibrium rate of return, the manager invests the first time the discounted project value reaches the constant levelṼ (ρ) .
Recall the pricing measure Q 0 which compensates for market but not idiosyncratic risks. The next result recognizes that the McDonald and Siegel (1986) valuation in (31) can be written as an expectation under this pricing measure. This is in contrast to our incomplete model representation in Proposition 3.2 where the value is a non-linear function of an expectation under the same pricing measure.
It is worth highlighting further the connections between the three models. In both the risk-neutral and McDonald and Siegel (1986) models, the expected rate of return on V is ν − ληρ. In the McDonald and Siegel (1986) model, this comes from the CAPM. Proposition 4.3 says the value is the Q 0 -expectation of the payoff, where V follows (16) under Q 0 . In the risk-neutral model, we have representation (17) for option value. Since ρ = 1, in fact Q 0 = Q (the risk-neutral probability) and V has expected rate of return ν − λη. We now give the representation of the McDonald and Siegel (1986) value in terms of Q 0 . 
Proof: It is straightforward to show by considering the dynamics of the discounted project value from (16) that p (ρ) (v) satisfies the Bellman equation in (29), Proposition 4.2.
We now come to our main result of this section. It says that in the limit as, first, the partial spanning asset becomes perfect or, second, the risk-aversion γ goes to zero, the value of the option, β 
(B) McDonald and Siegel (1986): As γ → 0,
Proof: See the Appendix.
Qualitative Differences due to Incomplete Markets: Implications for Investment
Despite the incomplete model containing the risk-neutral and McDonald and Siegel (1986) models as special cases, risk-aversion to idiosyncratic risk gives a crucial qualitative difference in the investment decision to these classic models. In this section we highlight this difference and the implications for investment. Recall, under the incomplete partial spanning model, the manager invests in the case where β (ρ,γ) 1 > 0, or equivalently only when ξ < λρ + η 2 . The Sharpe ratio on the project value must be lower than this critical value for investment to be optimal. As described in Section 2, outside this case, the firm should postpone investment indefinitely. However, the corresponding critical value in the risk-neutral and McDonald and Siegel (1986) models differs from our incomplete one.
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Fix r, λ and η > 0. We begin with some definitions. Let ξ * = ξ * (ρ, γ) be the largest 16 value of the project's Sharpe ratio in the partial spanning model, given values of ρ and γ, for which there is a finite investment trigger, and for which the value of the option to invest is finite. 17 Then (see the discussion after (11)) ξ * = λρ + η 2 . Let ξ * RN = ξ * RN (1, γ) be the largest value of the project's Sharpe ratio in the risk-neutral or perfect spanning model for which there is a finite investment trigger, and for which the value of the option to invest is finite. Then (see Proposition 4.1) ξ * RN = λ. Finally, let ξ * M S = ξ * M S (ρ, 0) be the largest value of the project's Sharpe ratio in the McDonald and Siegel (1986) model given values of ρ for which there is a finite investment trigger, and for which the value of the option to invest is finite. Then (see Proposition 4.2) ξ * M S = λρ. The following theorem is now immediate.
The above theorem observes that the criteria for investment to take place at some time in the future are different in the incomplete partial spanning model compared with the riskneutral and McDonald and Siegel models. In the partial spanning model, there is a larger critical value for the Sharpe ratio, leading to more situations where the manager should invest. We can illustrate this on a simple graph, see Figure 1 . Each of ξ * , ξ * M S and ξ * RN is represented on the graph as a function of ρ. Note ξ * RN is just the single value λ when correlation is one. The higher line with slope λ = 0.3 represents ξ * , the highest Sharpe ratio under the incomplete partial spanning model where a finite investment trigger and option value can be found. For Sharpe ratios below this line, the partial spanning model recommends investment is undertaken at some point in the future. The corresponding line ξ * M S for the McDonald and Siegel (1986) model is the lower one, with the difference between the two lines due to the project volatility η = 0.2. When correlation is one, ξ * M S = ξ * RN = λ. Theorem 4.5 observes that as ρ → 1, the line ξ * and point ξ * RN do not coincide. Likewise, as γ → 0 the position of the two lines ξ * and ξ * M S does not change. In the degenerate case of η = 0, ξ * = ξ * M S and both tend to ξ * RN as correlation tends to one. Since the line ξ * lies above the line ξ * M S , there is an additional region for the Sharpe ratio between the two lines, where the McDonald and Siegel model recommends postponing investment indefinitely, but the partial spanning model concludes that it is optimal to invest at some finite trigger level. Under the partial spanning model, the firm will be more likely to invest and will invest sooner than under the McDonald and Siegel (1986) model.
It is more difficult to compare the conditions for the incomplete partial spanning model and risk-neutral model since the former applies for |ρ| < 1 and the risk-neutral model for ρ 2 = 1. However, if ρ is close to one, ξ < ξ * will be satisfied more often than the analogous risk-neutral condition ξ < ξ * RN and the firm will be more likely to invest. The qualitative features outlined here clearly distinguish the incomplete model from the classic models. In Proposition 4.4, we saw that as ρ → 1, the value and investment trigger level approach the risk-neutral model value and trigger. However, for values of correlation close to one, there is a range of values for the project's Sharpe ratio, ξ, for which the value 16 In fact ξ * is the supremum of those values for which there is a finite investment trigger and the option value is finite. When ξ = ξ * these quantities are infinite. and investment trigger for the partially spanned model are finite, but the risk-neutral solution is degenerate. That is, the risk-neutral model recommends the firm waits indefinitely, whilst our model gives a trigger level that the project value must reach for investment to take place. This is illustrated in Figure 1 by the top triangular area where ρ > 0.65 and ξ > λ. This area gets larger when project volatility η increases.
Similarly, we saw that as γ → 0, the value and investment trigger level approach the McDonald and Siegel model value and trigger. However, with risk-aversion γ, there is again a range of values for the Sharpe ratio, ξ, for which the value and investment trigger for the partially spanned model are finite, but the McDonald and Siegel model solution is degenerate. This is exactly represented by the area between the two sloped lines in Figure 1 . Again, this area is larger when uncertainty is greater.
We can now ask how these new features might impact on a manager's investment decision if the manager were using the classic risk-neutral model. Suppose the manager decides there is a traded asset which has correlation quite close to one with the project. Then, in some sense it is reasonable to approximate the value of the option to invest using the well-known risk-neutral, complete model. However, our discussion (and the result of Theorem 4.5) shows that if the parameters of the risk-neutral model are such that the manager concludes he should postpone investment, then it not possible to conclude that it is optimal to postpone investment in the incomplete model even when the correlation is high. Rather, it may in fact be optimal to invest at some finite trigger level. This will be the case if the project Sharpe ratio and correlation put the firm into the top triangular area of Figure 1 . Thus a widely held belief that a risk-neutral model is a good approximation tool in an "almost complete" situation is wrong. Using the risk-neutral model can lead the manager to an incorrect conclusion concerning investment timing.
A similar question can be asked for a manager using the McDonald and Siegel (1986) model. If the manager believes risk-aversion to idiosyncratic risks should not play a major role, then it can approximate the option value via the McDonald and Siegel model. Again, our analysis shows that if the McDonald and Siegel (1986) model concludes investment should be postponed indefinitely then it is not possible to conclude the same in the incomplete model where the manager is averse to idiosyncratic risk. Figure 1 shows this by the gap between the two lines for the critical Sharpe ratios, ξ * and ξ * M S . Again in this case, the McDonald and Siegel (1986) model is not a good approximation if risk-aversion to idiosyncratic risks, γ, is non-zero and can lead to the wrong conclusion on investment timing.
We can also compare the two classic models to each other. Both models have identical criteria if the correlation is perfect. However, if this is not the case, the McDonald and Siegel (1986) critical Sharpe ratio is always lower than λ, at least in the natural case where Sharpe ratios and correlation are positive. A manager following the risk-neutral model is more likely to invest and will invest sooner than one following the McDonald and Siegel model. We observe this later in Figure 5 . observe the impact of imperfect correlation, risk-aversion and uncertainty via illustrative examples and comparative statics. In doing so, we will observe the striking feature of the model discussed in the previous section, namely that additional scenarios are possible whereby the incomplete and classic models give conflicting signals on investment.
In our analysis, we will fix the value of α = ξ − λρ. When we change correlation or risk-aversion, fixing α is equivalent to fixing δ, the below-equilibrium rate-of-return-shortfall. This is consistent with assuming that δ is a fundamental parameter in agreement with the discussion in Dixit and Pindyck (1994) [Chapter 5] and tables I-III in McDonald and Siegel (1986) . Note that on Figures 2-5 , the displayed values and triggers represent discounted values. We have used the same parameter values as the example in Section 5.4 of Dixit and Pindyck (1994) (and Pindyck (1991) ) for comparison purposes. Parameters for all graphs are given in the captions.
Consider first the incomplete model and assume β (ρ,γ) 1 > 1, or equivalently ξ < ξ * M S . In this case, all models considered give a finite option value. Figure 2 corresponds to this case. The top graph displays the investment triggerṼ (ρ,γ) obtained from (12). Each value ofṼ (ρ,γ) corresponds to the level of S where the two sides of (12) are equal. This is where the curve
intersects the line S − K represented by the dashed line. The top line (labelled S/β
1 ) corresponds to the risk-neutral model (ρ 2 = 1), and givesṼ (1) = 1.5. 18 The remaining (lower) curves all correspond to values of |ρ| < 1.
As correlation is reduced in the incomplete model, the corresponding investment trigger is shown to be lower. 19 Hence, the more incomplete the model becomes, the sooner the manager should invest. Waiting involves facing unhedgeable idiosyncratic risks, so the riskaverse manager is induced to invest earlier as unhedgeable risks become greater.
The lower panel of Figure 2 gives the value of the option to invest. The curved lines represent option value, calculated via (14) for a range of correlation values. The highest curve corresponds to the risk-neutral value, given in Proposition 4.1. As correlation is reduced, the option value curve shifts downwards and, corresponding to the top panel, the investment trigger falls. We can conclude that as the model becomes more incomplete, the value of the option to invest falls. The risk-averse manager places less value on the option as unhedgeable risks become larger. Now consider the second case 0 < β 1 , which now never crosses the dotted line S − K, and hence the manager should never invest. Once correlation is less than perfect however, the curves corresponding to f (S) cross S − K at a finite trigger,Ṽ (ρ,γ) , marked on the figure. For instance, when correlation drops from 1 to 0.99, the investment trigger goes from being infinite to having finite value 8.36.
The lower panel of Figure 3 gives the corresponding option values for a range of correlations. Recall if correlation is perfect, for these values for β (ρ,γ) 1 , the investment trigger is infinite and the option value is also infinite. The firm should postpone investment in this case. However, for less than perfect correlation, the option value is finite and there is a finite investment triggerṼ (ρ,γ) , above which the firm should invest. The highest option value in the lower panel of Figure 3 corresponds to ρ = 0.95 (taking higher values swamped the remaining lines on the graph). Just as we observed from Figure 2 , as the model becomes more incomplete, the risk-averse manager invests sooner and places less value on the option.
One final observation from the lower panel of Figure 3 is that the option value is not convex everywhere in the project value. We will return to this important point later in this section, following a discussion of the effect of risk-aversion.
Displayed in Figure 4 are option values for various levels of risk aversion, γ. Both appear to be very similar to the lower panels of Figures 2 and 3 . This is because correlation and risk aversion have similar effects on the option value and investment. For this reason, we do not repeat graphs for the investment triggers. 20 The upper panel treats the case β (ρ,γ) 1 > 1 (or ξ < ξ * M S ) whilst the lower panel considers 0 < β
. Correlation is held fixed at 0.9 for both panels, other parameter values are given in the caption. In the top panel, the highest curve corresponds to the McDonald and Siegel valuation, which is the special case γ = 0. As γ is increased, the option value and investment trigger are reduced.
The lower panel of Figure 4 treats the second case, 0 < β Figure 4 are values for risk aversions γ = 1, 5, 10, 20, from highest to lowest on the graph. Again, these are not convex everywhere in the project value. Both panels in Figure 4 demonstrate that as a manager becomes more risk-averse, he places less value on the option to invest and is induced to invest earlier.
We have seen the effect of correlation and risk-aversion via the figures. It is also possible, although tedious, to obtain the following comparative statics result.
Proposition 6.1 Under the incomplete partial spanning model, for fixed α, the investment triggerṼ (ρ,γ) and value of the option to invest p (ρ,γ) (v) are (i) increasing in |ρ|; and (ii) decreasing in γ. 
Proof:
The calculations are available from the author upon request.
Observe from the lower panels of Figures 3 and 4 , that the option value is no longer everywhere convex in the project value when ξ * M S < ξ < ξ * . 21 We can show
∂v 2 p (ρ,γ) (v) > 0 and the value of the option is convex in v.
(ii) If 0 < β (ρ,γ) 1 < 1, or equivalently ξ * M S < ξ < ξ * , the value of the option may be convex or concave depending on the value of v.
Proof: We can prove this result either by straightforward differentiation or by using the representation in (A-10). See the Appendix for details.
The result of the proposition confirms what we have seen in the figures. There are two effects operating here. Firstly, a convexity effect from optionality. In a complete market, option values are convex in the underlying asset, in this case, project value. This convexity effect carries over to our incomplete market, and dominates in the case β (ρ,γ) 1 ≥ 1. That is, in the case ξ ≤ ξ * M S , the option value is convex regardless of risk-aversion, and model parameters. However, in other situations, when β (ρ,γ) 1 < 1 or ξ * M S < ξ < ξ * , there is a second effect, that of the manager's risk-aversion to idiosyncratic risks, influencing the value in the incomplete model. Risk-aversion and incompleteness mean that the additional option value from an extra dollar of project value diminishes as project value increases. In the case ξ * M S < ξ < ξ * , this becomes important and the effect of risk-aversion can outweigh the optionality effect, resulting in concavity in the project value.
Qualitatively (as well as quantitatively) the incomplete model gives markedly different conclusions to the risk-neutral and McDonald and Siegel (1986) models. A final difference we investigate concerns the effect of uncertainty on option value. Typically, uncertainty is thought to increase option value and delay investment. This is indeed the case in the riskneutral model, and in the McDonald and Siegel (1986) model when δ, the below-equilibrium rate-of-return shortfall, or α, is kept fixed. 22 However, the lower panel of Figure 5 shows that uncertainty can reduce the value of the option to invest and speed up investment in our incomplete model. The lower panel takes β (ρ,γ) 1 ≤ 1, and for values of η < 0.16, β (ρ,γ) < 0 giving an infinite option value. Increasing η from 0.16 reduces the option value and the associated investment trigger level.
In the top panel of Figure 5 , β (ρ,γ) 1 > 1 and all models under consideration give a finite investment trigger. The highest curve is the McDonald and Siegel (1986) valuation, the middle curve is the risk-neutral, and the lowest curve is the incomplete valuation, for various η. All models give values which increase in uncertainty, η. For low η, it may be optimal to invest immediately since the project value could already be above the investment trigger level. In this case, the option is worth its intrinsic value, corresponding to the flat piece on the graph. Interestingly, the risk-neutral value lies below the McDonald and Siegel (1986) value here, since λ, ρ > 0. It would be possible to observe the reverse if either λ < 0 or ρ < 0.
Under the risk-neutral and McDonald and Siegel (1986) models, as η → ∞, the option value becomes infinite. That is, more and more uncertainty is reflected in higher and higher option values. In contrast, the manager's valuation of the option in our incomplete model approaches a finite level as η → ∞. This is true in both panels of Figure 5 . In the incomplete model, the manager's risk-aversion to idiosyncratic risks keeps the option value from becoming too large. In the classic models, however, this is not taken into account.
Conclusion
This paper has formulated and analyzed a new model for corporate investment decisions. It recognizes that idiosyncratic risks exist, and introduces these via a partial spanning asset, one which has less than perfect correlation with the underlying project. In doing so, the paper extends the well known risk-neutral models and the CAPM based model of McDonald and Siegel (1986) to incompleteness. Reassuringly, these models are recovered as limiting cases of our incomplete partial spanning model.
Our conclusions are that the classic models are overstating the worth of the option to invest, and recommending a manager waits too long to invest. As such, the classic models may be leading to under-investment. Incorporating incompleteness and risk-aversion to idiosyncratic risks results in a recommendation that managers invest earlier, as the option to invest is less valuable. Moreover, we discover an important qualitative distinction between the solutions to our incomplete model and those of the classic models. Namely, the critical value of the project Sharpe ratio distinguishing the "invest at a trigger level" and "postpone investment forever" cases differs. In particular, if either the risk-neutral or McDonald and Siegel (1986) models conclude investment should be postponed indefinitely, it is not necessarily the case that the same conclusion holds in the incomplete model even if correlation is high or risk-aversion to idiosyncratic risks is small. It may in fact be optimal to invest when the project value reaches a given trigger level, and using the classic models in an incomplete situation could lead to an incorrect investment decision. This managerial behavior is induced by risk-aversion to idiosyncratic risk present in our framework.
Various extensions of the partial spanning model presented could be undertaken. Firstly, models other than lognormal could be assumed for the project value, see Footnote 6. For instance, mean-reverting models are increasingly popular, see Bhattacharya (1978) , Dixit and Pindyck (1994) and Schwartz (1997) . Although we have analyzed options to invest in this paper, the same framework could be used to examine abandonment decisions. The conclusion of such an extension would be that the manager should abandon earlier than under a riskneutral or CAPM style model, as treated in Myers and Majd (1990) and McDonald and Siegel (1986) respectively. Investment (and similarly, abandonment) decisions with a finite horizon can also be modeled in an incomplete framework. Of course, the option value and trigger level cannot be found in closed form in this case, making general conclusions difficult to obtain.
The effects of strategic competition on the value of the option to invest are beyond the scope of this paper, see Smit and Trigeorgis (2004) for an overview and recent developments. Typically competition introduces an incentive to pre-empt other firms and invest earlier than classic real options models suggest. This conclusion is in common with ours but based on different reasoning. An interesting area of future research is to combine the two frameworks in an attempt to evaluate whether incompleteness or competition has greater impact on valuation and investment.
Our conclusion that firms should invest earlier in an incomplete market is consistent with the empirical evidence of Huddart and Lang (1996) that executives exercise their options much sooner than a complete model recommends. Empirical testing of real options models is in its early stages, see Berger et al (1996) and Moel and Tufano (2002) . This paper raises many questions which could potentially be empirically tested. For instance, what are typical correlations between projects and the traded assets that managers have access to? Are managers investing earlier than classic real options models recommend? Can we determine if managers are investing when the project Sharpe ratio is higher than the critical value suggested in the classic models? Much work remains to be done in this area.
However, in the perpetual problem of this paper, we need to describe how the manager values the amount X τ + (V τ − Ke r(τ −t) ) + at an intermediate date τ < ∞. To do this, we need to think about time consistency properties of utility functions. This is a new approach, although alternative ways of treating infinite horizon portfolio problems exist, such as those maximizing the growth rate of a portfolio, see for example, Hakansson (1971) .
We temporarily forget about the option and infinite horizon complications and concentrate on a finite horizon T ′ ≥ t where t is fixed. Assume we aim to maximize expected utility of wealth, given wealth follows (4). Consider also an intermediate date t ≤ T ≤ T ′ . At T ′ , we assume utility of wealth is described by the exponential utility function
where A T ′ is some constant and the constant absolute risk aversion γ T ′ reflects risk-aversion at date T ′ .
To decide how to value wealth at the intermediate time T , consider choosing any investment strategy over [t, T ] and the optimal strategy between T and T ′ . This optimal strategy is the Merton (1969) strategy given by
We can write (using the Merton (1969) The right hand side is now an optimization problem over the sub-horizon [t, T ]. To value consistently with T ′ cashflows, we would like the utility function valuing cashflows at T to take the form
where A T is constant and γ T reflects risk aversion for time T . From (A-1) we must have where in both (A-3) and (A-4), A t is a constant and γ t is the constant absolute risk-aversion parameter for today, t. From here on, and throughout the main text of the paper, we denote γ t = γ and A t = A for ease of notation. Using (A-3) in (A-4) gives A T = Ae We see that the terminal date T ′ has disappeared in the time consistent utility used at T ≤ T ′ . For this reason, this is also the appropriate utility to use when the horizon T ′ is infinite.
Returning to our perpetual problem, the appropriate time consistent utility function to use is U τ (x) = − A γ e −γe −r(τ −t) x e and Y u = X u e −r(u−t) , S u = V u e −r(u−t) ,θ u = θ u e −r(u−t) ,P u = P u e −r(u−t) giving dynamics dY u =θ u dP P , dS S = η(ξdu + dW ), dP P = σ(λdu + dB).
In the stopping region H(y, s) = − A γ e −γ(y+(s−K) + ) and LH ≤ 0. The stopping region is characterized by the investment time τ * given by τ * = inf u ≥ t : S u ≥Ṽ (ρ,γ) = inf u ≥ t : V u ≥Ṽ (ρ,γ) e r(u−t)
That is, when the discounted project value reaches the constant levelṼ (ρ,γ) λ 2 (τ −t) e −γ(Yτ +(Sτ −K) + ) |Y t = x, S t = v = H(x, v).
We can now rewrite (A-9) and the continuation region as given in Section 2. Proof of Proposition 3.2 A similar representation in terms of Q 0 is shown in the case of finite-time American options in Musiela and Zariphopoulou (2003) and in the European case by Henderson (2002) . We extend the representation here to the perpetual American option under consideration. First, write the value in Proposition 3.1 as
(A-10)
We now propose a form for Γ(v) and verify it satisfies the pde (7) and associated boundary conditions. For the proposition to be true, we must have that Γ(v) = inf τ <∞ E Q 0 (e −γ(1−ρ 2 )e −r(τ −t) (Vτ −Ke r(τ −t) ) + |V t = v) (A-11)
where Q 0 is defined in (15). The boundary condition in (8) In the continuation region,Γ(s) < e −γ(1−ρ 2 )(s−K) + and
Discounting and substituting from the dynamics in (16) and taking expectations, we obtain 0 =Γ s Sη(ξ − λρ) + 1 2Γ ss S 2 η 2 .
